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PARTIES TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The parties to this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari are 
the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants/Appellants Ralph and 
Sallie Eastman; Defendants/Appellees Paul and Claudia Weston; 
Defendant/Appellee Jay, L. Brasher (d/b/a Salt Lake Auto 
Auction); Defendant/Appellee Manuel Ontiveros (d/b/a Custom Auto 
Sales; Defendant/Appellee Western Surety Company; 
Defendants/Plaintiffs/Cross-Claim Defendants/Appellees Jimmie R. 
Hill and William E. Hill; and Defendant/Counterclaim 
Plaintiff/Cross-Claim Plaintiff Bradford M. Medico. 
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IV 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Questions of Fact; 
1) Did the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals err 
in concluding that Appellee Medico recorded his interest in the 
Winnebago Motor Home on January 20, 1988, as stated in the trial 
court's Minute Entry dated December 31, 1990? 
2) Did the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals err 
in concluding that Appellee Medico's interest in the Winnebago 
Motor Home was recorded prior to the time that the Appellants 
recorded their lien on the Motor Home? 
Questions of Law; 
1) Did the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals err 
as a matter of law in concluding that a person who fraudulently 
obtains a title to a motor vehicle can thereafter transfer valid 
title to that vehicle? 
2) Did the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals err 
as a matter of law in concluding that a person who obtains title 
to a vehicle by surrendering a fraudulently-obtained title to 
that vehicle can thereafter transfer valid title to that vehicle 
to another? 
3) Did the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals err 
as a matter of law in concluding that, under Utah law, a person 
need not comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, Section 41-1-72, in order to effect a legal transfer 
of a motor vehicle required to be licensed in the State of Utah? 
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4) Did the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals err 
as a matter of law in concluding that Summary Judgment in favor 
of the Appellee was appropriate in this matter? 
5) Did the trial court and the Court of Appeals apply the 
proper standards when deciding and reviewing Medico's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
V 
DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
On November 22, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an 
Order of Affirmance, affirming, without comment, the decision of 
the trial Court. The appeal was argued on November 19, 1991 
under Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
VI 
JURISDICTION 
The Appellants invoke the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme 
Court to review this matter based on the fact that the Utah 
Court's affirmance of the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment 
is directly in opposition to sixty years of decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court wherein the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that a fraudulently obtained title to a motor vehicle cannot pass 
valid title to that vehicle. The Appellants also invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to review this matter 
based on the fact that the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a 
decision of the trial court, wherein the trial court assumed the 
role of a revisionist historian and took it upon itself to 
rewrite the facts of the case to support the trial court's 
decision, where those revised facts cannot be justified by the 
evidence before the trial court. Additionally, neither the trial 
court nor the Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of 
judicial review when dealing with this case. 
A) The order of which the Appellant seeks review from this 
Court was entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on November 22, 
1991. 
B) On December 21, 1991, The Supreme Court granted the 
Appellants an extension of time until January 21, 1991 to file 
their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
C) The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 
78-2-2(5), at its discretion, to review the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's grant of Summary 
Judgment. 
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VIII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings at Lower Court Levels: 
1. On December 9, 1988, the Appellants filed suit against 
the Westons asserting causes of action based on breach of 
contract and lien foreclosure on the Winnebago and a Chevrolet 
Suburban. 
2. The Appellants were granted Judgment against the 
Westons on March 6, 1989, and the trial court ordered the Westons 
to surrender the Winnebago and the Suburban to the Appellants. 
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3. At a supplemental hearing, the Appellants learned that 
Weston had transferred the Winnebago to Brasher. 
4. Through a check of DMV records the Appellants then 
learned that the Winnebago had been transferred to the Hills. 
5. When the Appellants were able to contact the Hills and 
inform them of the trial court's order concerning the Winnebago, 
the Appellants learned that the Hills had sold the Winnebago to 
Medico. 
6. The Appellants then amended their Complaint against the 
Westons to include Brasher, the Hills and Medico. 
7. The Appellants were then contacted by counsel 
representing the Hills and informed that the Hills had purchased 
the Winnebago from Ontiveros, and that the Hills had previously 
filed a suit against Ontiveros and Western Surety with respect to 
the Hills purchase of the Winnebago. 
8. The Hills action against Ontiveros and Western Surety 
was then consolidated with the Appellants action against the 
Westons, Brasher, the Hills and Medico. 
9. On or about April 11, 1990, Medico filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking an order stating that Medico had 
received the Winnebago free and clear of any interest in the 
Winnebago by the Appellants. 
10. The trial court granted Medico's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on May 14, 199 0. 
11. The trial court then set aside the Summary Judgment 
Order and reconsidered Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
12. On December 30, 1990 the trial court filed a Minute 
Entry wherein the trial court stated that the initial grant of 
Summary Judgment in favor of Medico was proper and that the 
Summary Judgment Order would be re-signed. 
13. On December 30, 1990, the trial court also resigned the 
Summary Judgment Order in favor of Medico and the Judgment was 
re-entered on that date. 
14. The Appellants filed their Notice of appeal on January 
31, 1991. 
15. On November 19, 1991, pursuant to Rule 31 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, oral argument on the Appellants1 
Appeal was held before a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
16. On November 22, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered an 
Order of Affirmance, without comment, of the trial court's 
Summary Judgment Order. 
Statement of Facts: 
1. On or about March 31, 1987 the Appellants were in the 
process of selling real property (hereinafter, "the property") 
located in Rich County, State of Utah to the Westons. (Record, 
page 03, para. 07, page 39, para. 10.) 
2. At the closing of the sale of the property, it became 
apparent that the Westons did not have sufficient funds to pay 
all costs associated with purchasing the home. (Record, page 03, 
para. 08, page 39-40, para. 11) 
3. In order to complete the purchase of the property, the 
Westons gave the Appellants a promissory note in the amount of 
$5,685.00. (Record at page 03, para. 09.) 
4. The $5,685.00 sum represented the difference between 
the total selling price of the property and the amount of 
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financing obtained by the Westons at the closing. (Record, page 
03, para. 10.) 
5. The promissory not was signed on March 31, 1988, and 
required payment in full to the Appellants, in Saint George, 
Utah, on or before June 30, 1988. (Record, page 03-04, para. 11, 
page 40, para 12.) 
6. In order to secure payment on the promissory note, the 
Westons gave the Appellants liens on the Westons1 1971 Winnebago 
motor home and their 1978 Chevrolet Suburban. (Record, page 04, 
para. 15, page 40, para. 18, page 11.) 
7. The Westons actually gave the Appellants duplicate 
titles on the Winnebago and the Suburban to hold as security for 
the promissory note. (Record, page 129, para. 5, page 118, para. 
3.) 
8. The Appellants1 liens on the Winnebago and the Suburban 
were recognized by the DMV, and when the Appellants surrendered 
the duplicate titles, given them by the Westons, the DMV issued 
the Appellants new certificates of title showing the Appellants 
as lien holders on the Winnebago and the Suburban. (Record, page 
04, para. 16) 
9. Prior to the time that the Appellants recorded their 
lien on the Winnebago, Weston attempted to sell the Winnebago to 
Brasher. (Record, page 04, para. 17, page 41. para. 20) 
10. In order to facilitate the sale to Brasher, Weston 
secured another duplicate title to the Winnebago, by falsely 
certifying that there were no titles to the Winnebago outstanding 
and that the Winnebago was free and clear of all liens. (Record, 
page 119, para. 4, page 141) 
11. After he had obtained the second duplicate title to the 
Winnebago, Weston then endorsed the duplicate title to Granger 
Shamrock. (Record, page 119, para. 5, page 122) 
12. After Weston had endorsed the duplicate title to show 
Granger Shamrock as the owner, Weston then conveyed the Winnebago 
to Brasher. (Record, page 119, para. 5) 
13. Brasher never registered the Winnebago in his personal 
name, his corporate name or in the name of his d/b/a; nor, was 
any certificate of title ever issued on the Winnebago showing 
Brasher as the owner of the Winnebago. (Record, page 13 0, para. 
31, page 12, para 14. page 133) 
14. After Brasher was given the Winnebago, Brasher then 
conveyed the Winnebago to Ontiveros and merely gave Ontiveros the 
second duplicate title, which still showed Granger Shamrock as 
the owner of the Winnebago. (Record, page 131, para. 13) 
15. Ontiveros then sold the Winnebago to the Hills and 
again simply gave the Hills the second duplicate title obtained 
by Weston, which still listed Granger Shamrock as the owner of 
the Winnebago. (Record, page 131, para. 14) 
16. When the Hills surrendered the second duplicate title 
to the DMV and attempted to register and title the Winnebago, 
they learned that the Appellants had surrendered the first 
duplicate title to the Winnebago to the DMV and had been issued a 
new title listing the Appellants as lien holders on the 
Winnebago. (Record, page 131, para. 15, page 14.) 
17. On September 9, 1988, the DMV directed the Hills to 
surrender their title to the Winnebago to the DMV. (Record, page 
14, page 131, para. 116) 
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18. The DMV subsequently reversed their position, based on 
the mistaken belief that the second duplicate title to the 
Winnebago was in fact the "original title" to the Winnebago, and 
therefore pr-dated the duplicate title given to the Appellants as 
security for the March 1988 promissory note. (Record, pages 131, 
117 and 124) 
19. The Hills were issued a title to the Winnebago on 
November 8, 1988. (Record, page 124) 
20* The Hills subsequently sold the Winnebago to Medico and 
gave Medico the new title issued to the Hills by the DMV to 
consummate the sale of the Winnebago. (Record, page 119, para 
5.) 
21. Medico was issued a title to the Winnebago on September 
1, 1989. (Record, page 119, para. 5) 
IX 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Point I: 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals could only conclude that 
Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago on January 20, 1988 
if they ignore the evidence on file in this matter and rewrite 
the historical facts to coincide with their decision. 
In its December 31, 1990 Minute Entry, the trial court 
stated that Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago on 
January 20, 1991, and therefore, Medico's title to the Winnebago 
was prior in time to, and superior to the title to the Winnebago 
listing the Appellants as lien holders on the Winnebago. In 
making that determination, the trial court either confused the 
date on which Weston was issued the second duplicate title to the 
Winnebago with the date on which Medico was issued his title to 
the Winnebago, or the trial court simply chose to ignore the 
evidence before it. 
The Court of Appeals, likewise, either confused the date on 
which Medico was issued title to the Winnebago with the date on 
which Weston was issued the second duplicate title to the 
Winnebago, or it also simply chose to ignore the evidence in the 
file. Which ever the case may be, the Court of Appeals could not 
sustain the trial court's conclusion that Medico recorded his 
interest in the Winnebago on January 20, 1988 without either 
confusing the facts or simply ignoring the facts. 
The Hills recorded their interest in the Winnebago on 
November 8, 1988. (Record, page 124). Medico purchased the 
Winnebago from the Hills. (Record, page 119, para 5). 
Therefore, unless Medico purchased the Winnebago from the Hills 
before they purchased the Winnebago from Ontiveros, it physically 
and logically impossible for Medico to have recorded his interest 
in the Winnebago on January 20, 1988, as stated in the trial 
court's December 31, 1990 Minute Entry. 
Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago on September 
1, 1989. (Record, page 119). Therefore, for the trial court to 
state that Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago on 
January 20, 1988 is unsupported by any facts, whatsoever. For 
the Court of Appeals to affirm that conclusion is totally 
incomprehensible and such a departure from judicial review and 
procedure that it mandates that this Court grant the Appellants1 
Petitin for Certiorari and properly review this matter. 
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Point II 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals could only conclude that 
Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago prior to the time 
the Appellants recorded their lien on the Winnebago if the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals ignore the evidence on file and 
rewrite the facts to coincide with their decision. 
The Appellants recorded their lien on the Winnebago on March 
1, 1988. Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago on 
September 1, 1989. Clearly, September 1, 1989 is not prior in 
time to March 1, 1988. Consequently, it is once again logically 
impossible, and legally indefensible, for the trial court to 
declare that Medico recorded his interest in the Winnebago prior 
to the time that the Appellants recorded their lien on the 
Winnebago. And it is manifest departure from judicial procedure, 
logic and reason for the Court of Appeals to affirm a decision 
that states as a matter of fact that September 1, 1989 is prior 
to March 1, 1988. Therefore, it is imperative that this Court 
grant the Appellants1 Petition for Certiorari in order to correct 
the rift in time and space that presently exists due the trial 
court's decision and the Court of Appeals1 affirmation of that 
decision. 
Point III; 
In order for the trial court grant Summary Judgment in favor of 
Medico, and in order for the Court of Appeals to affirm that 
grant of summary judgment, both courts had to ignore sixty years 
of decisions by this Court holding a person who fraudulently 
obtains title to a motor vehicle cannot thereafter pass valid 
title to that vehicle. 
It is an undisputed fact that at the time Weston obtained 
the second duplicate title to the Winnebago (which title was used 
to transfer the Winnebago from Weston to Brasher, from Brasher to 
Ontiveros and from Ontiveros to the Hills) that Weston had 
l o 
previously given the Appellants a duplicate title to the 
Winnebago. (Record, page 119, para. 5). It is also an 
undisputed fact that at the time Weston obtained the second 
duplicate title which was used to transfer the Winnebago from 
Weston to Brasher, from Brasher to Ontiveros and from Ontiveros 
to the Hills, that Weston fraudulently certified that title to 
the Winnebago had not been endorsed, delivered to a transferee, 
or pledged as collateral. (Record, page 119, para. 4, page 141). 
In is a well-established principal of law, accepted in 
virtually all jurisdictions, that a document of title which has 
been obtained through fraud cannot pass valid title to a vehicle. 
See Winship v. Standard Finance Co., 40 Ariz 382, 12 P.2d, 283 
(1932); White v. Pike, 240 Iowa 596, 36 N.W.2d 761 (1941); Zollto 
v. Scott, 160 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. Ohio 1959); Avis Rent-A-Car 
Systems, Inc., v. Harrison Motor Co., 151 So.2d 855 (Dist. Ct. 
App. Fla. 1963); Vannoy Chevrolet Co. v. Baum, 151 N.W.2d 515 
(Iowa 1967); Yousey v. Boqel, 457 S.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. Tex.) 
1970); Erie United Bank v. Fowl, 71 Ohio App. 220, 49 N.E.2d 61 
(1942). Utah case law is in accord with this generally accepted 
principal of law. 
Utah case law has also long and consistently held that a 
document of title which has been obtained through fraud cannot 
pass valid title to a vehicle. Beginning with the case of Swartz 
v. White, 80 Utah 150, 13 P.2d 643 (1932) and continuing through 
the present time, the Utah Supreme Court has continually held 
that one who fraudulently obtains title to a vehicle is unable to 
convey good title to another. 
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In the instant matter, it is undisputed that Weston obtained 
the second duplicate title to the Winnebago by fraudulently 
certifying that title to the Winnebago had not been endorsed, 
delivered to a transferee, or pledged as collateral. Therefore, 
both courts had to ignore the express holdings of nearly sixty 
years of Utah law established by this Court, in order for the 
trial court to grant Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment and for 
the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's grant of Summary 
Judgment,. The decision of the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals to ignore or implicitly over-rule the decisions of this 
Court mandate that this Court exercise its discretion and review 
the decision of the trial court and the affirmance of the Court 
of Appeal. 
Point IV: 
In order for the trial court grant Summary Judgment in favor of 
Medico, and in order for the Court of Appeals to affirm that 
grant of summary judgment, both courts had to ignore sixty years 
of decisions by this Court holding a person cannot pass better 
title to a vehicle than he himself has. 
In Swartz v. White, supra, this Court declared that no one 
can transfer better title the he has. This is a generally 
accepted principal of law. See Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., v. 
Harrison Motor Co., supra, declaring: "It is elementary that no 
one can transfer or confer better title to chattels than he 
himself has." 
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that at the time 
Medico obtained the second document of title to the Winnebago, 
and at the time Weston conveyed the Winnebago to Brasher, Weston 
had already give the Appellants title to the Winnebago and a lien 
on the Winnebago. (Record, page 118, para.3 ). Therefore, under 
well-established Utah law, at time Weston obtained the second 
title to the Winnebago, and at the time he conveyed the Winnebago 
to Brasher, Weston could only have conveyed such title to the 
Winnebago as he himself had, i.e. a title subject to the 
Appellants1 lien. 
The trial court's decision to ignore the holdings of this 
Court with respect to this issue and the Court of Appeals1 
affirmance of that decision further mandate that this Court 
exercise its prerogative to review this matter. 
Point V; 
In order for the trial court grant Summary Judgment in favor of 
Medico, and in order for the Court of Appeals to affirm that 
grant of summary judgment, both courts had to ignore express 
holdings of this Court wherein this Court stated that title to a 
motor vehicle does not pass until the transferee has complied 
with the provisions of U.C.A. Section 41-1-72. 
Begging with Swartz v. White, supra, and continuing through 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Holt, 28 Ut.2d 426, 503 
P.2d 1205, 1206 (1972) this Court has repeatedly declared that 
until the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
Section 41-1-72 (hereinafter, "Section 41-1-72") have been 
complied with, title to a motor vehicle, that is required to be 
titled and registered under Utah law, does not pass. Section 41-
1-72 specifically states: 
Until the department shall have issued such new certificate 
of registration and certificate of ownership, delivery of 
any vehicle required to be registered shall be deemed not to 
have been made and title thereto shall be deemed to be 
incomplete and not valid or effective for any purpose except 
as provided in Section 41-1-77. (Emphasis added). 
Until the requirements of Section 41-1-77 have been met, a person 
cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value. Swartz v. 
White, supra. 
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It is undisputed that Brasher and Ontiveros never attempted 
to register the Winnebago under their own names, their corporate 
names or in the names of their respective d/b/a. It is also an 
undisputed fact that the Hills never attempted to title and 
register the Winnebago until after the Appellants had been issued 
a new title to the Winnebago showing the Appellants as lien 
holders on the Winnebago. (Record, page 13 0-131, para. 12-14). 
Therefore, under the express provisions of Section 41-1-77 and 
the case law interpreting Section 41-1-77, there was never a 
valid transfer of the Winnebago to either Brasher or Ontiveros. 
Consequently, on March 1, 1988, when the Appellants recorded 
their lien on the Winnebago and were issued a new title to the 
Winnebago, Weston was still the legal owner of the Winnebago, 
subject to the Appellants1 security interest and lien on the 
vehicle. 
Because the Appellants recorded their lien on the Winnebago 
prior to the time that any valid transfer of the Winnebago was 
made by Weston, the Appellants1 title to the Winnebago and their 
lien on the Winnebago is prior in time to, and superior, to any 
claim of interest in the Winnebago by Brasher, Ontiveros, the 
Hills, or Medico. 
The decision of the trial court to ignore controlling case 
law and the express provisions of Section 41-1-77 mandate that 
this case be reviewed by this Court. 
Point VI; 
In order for the trial court grant Summary Judgment in favor of 
Medico, and in order for the Court of Appeals to affirm that 
grant of sumiaary judgment, both courts had to improperly conclude 
that there were no material issues of fact present in the case 
1 A 
that precluded summary judgment in favor of Medico and that 
Medico was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
In order for the trial Court and to grant Medico's Summary 
Judgment Motion, and in order for the Court of Appeals to affirm 
the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment, both courts had to 
conclude that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
present in the case and that Medico was entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In Medico's Statement Facts, contained in his Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Medico makes, the following statements: 
A) On January 5, 1988, the Winnebago was sold at Salt Lake 
Auto Auction to Manuel Ontiveros, dba Custom Auto Sales. 
Mr. Ontiveros sold the Winnebago to William and Ruth Hill, 
who sold it to Mr. Medico. This chain of title was recorded 
on January 20, 1988. Ingersoll affidavits 5. (Record, 
page 113, para 2). 
B) The Eastmans did not record the pledge or any evidence 
of a transfer of title until February 17, 1988, more than 
three weeks after the Winnebago had been sold at auction on 
January 5, 1988. Ingersoll affidavits 6. (Record, page 
114, para. 4) 
The referenced statements of "Fact" are directly controverted not 
only by the exhibits filed by the Appellants in opposition to 
Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment, but also by the Affidavit 
of Kip Ingersoll which was submitted in support of Medico's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Paragraph No. 4 of his Affidavit Mr. Ingersoll does not 
state that the Winnebago was sold on January 5, 1988, as asserted 
in Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment. Paragraph No. 4 of Mr. 
Ingersoll's Affidavit only states that: "On January 8, 1988 Mr. 
Weston submitted a second application for duplicate of title. 
Based on this application, he received a title which was issued 
on January 11, 1988." (Emphasis added). 
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Likewise, Mr. Ingersoll does not state, in paragraph No. 5 
of his Affidavit, that the Winnebago was sold on January 5, 1988, 
as Medico asserts in his statement of facts contained in his 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. In 
fact, Mr. Ingersollfs Affidavit never indicates, in any manner 
whatsoever, the date on which Weston transferred the Winnebago to 
Brasher. 
In direct contradiction of Medico's alleged statement of 
facts, Mr. Ingersoll specifically states that Weston did not even 
apply for the second duplicate of title until January 8, 1988, 
three days after Medico claims the Winnebago was sold to 
Ontiveros and that Weston did not actually receive the second 
duplicate title to the Winnebago until January 11, 1988, six days 
after the alleged sale to Ontiveros. (Record, page 118, para. 
6). Furthermore, Exhibit B attached to Mr. Ingersoll's affidavit 
demonstrates that on January 20, 1988 Weston recorded the second 
duplicate title listing Grangei: Shamrock as the new owner of the 
Winnebago. (Record, page 112). 
Consequently, one has to question how the Winnebago could 
have been sold to Ontiveros on January 5, 1988, as asserted by 
Medico, when Weston did not even have a title to the Winnebago 
until January 11, 1988 and how the Winnebago could have been sold 
to Ontiveros on January 5, 1988 and yet the DMV recorded and 
recognized a title filed with the DMV on January 20, 1988 listing 
Granger Shamrock as the new owner of the Winnebago. These facts 
are all set forth in Mr. Ingersollfs affidavit, and sworn to by 
Mr. Ingersoll as a part of his Affidavit. Therefore, there 
genuine and profound questions of material fact are present in 
this case which precluded the trial court from entering Summary 
Judgment in favor of Medico. 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on 
the other side of a controversy and create an issue of fact, 
precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975). Mr. Ingersoll's Affidavit directly raises issues of 
material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
Therefore, Summary Judgment in favor of Medico was inappropriate. 
The presence of issues of material facts precludes a court from 
granting summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. V. Abbott, 
562 P.2d, 288 (Utah 1977). 
Medico based his opposition to Appellants1 Appeal on the 
fact that the Appellants did not file affidavits in opposition to 
Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, this Court has 
repeatedly held that opposing affidavits are not required in 
order to preclude an entry of Summary Judgment. See D & L 
Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Mountain States Tel, 
& Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984); Christensen ex rel. Christensen v. Financial Service 
Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963). This is particularly 
true when, in cases such as this, the very documents submitted by 
the moving party demonstrate that issues of fact are present in 
the case. 
Furthermore, Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically specifies that a Summary Judgment motion 
may be opposed by affidavits or otherwise. In this matter, the 
Appellants opposed Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment by 
submitting titles and other documents obtained from the DMV to 
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oppose the assertions of fact in Medico's Memorandum in Support 
of his Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the Appellants 
properly opposed Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
properly and timely raised issues of fact to preclude the entry 
of Summary Judgment in favor of Medico. 
The trial court's and the Court of Appeals errors with 
respect to the controlling law have been set for in Points III 
and IV of this Petition and shall not be repeated here. It 
suffices to say that the errors with respect to the application 
of law are equally as egregious, if not more so, than the errors 
of fact. 
Because the trial court, and the Court of Appeals, chose to 
ignore the issues of fact and the issues of law and grant Summary 
Judgment is spite of the issues of fact and law, this Court 
should exercise its discretion and review this matter to insure 
that the proper application of this Court's decisions and the 
Rules promulgated by this Court are adhered to by lower courts. 
Point VII: 
The trial court applied an improper standard in ruling on 
Medico's Summary Judgment Motion, and the Court of Appeals 
applied an inappropriate standard in reviewing the trial court's 
decision. 
In rendering its Minute Entry, the trial court improperly 
made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The December 31, 
Minute Entry specifically states: 
The plaintiffs Eastman recorded their lien on February 17, 
1988. They could have protected their interests by 
recording the lien anytime after March 31, 1987. Because 
they failed to do so, defendant Medico purchased the vehicle 
unaware that there was an unrecorded lien. Medico recorded 
his interest on January 20, 1988. As such, he received his 
interest free of the lien claimed by the Eastmans. 
The trial court not only made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in its December 31, 1991 Minute entry, but it made incorrect 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. But, irrespective of 
the findings and conclusions were appropriate or inappropriate, 
it is improper for a trial court to determine the facts on a 
summary judgment motion. 
In W.M. Barnes Company v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) this Court declared that it is not 
appropriate on a motion for summary judgment to weigh disputed 
evidence. In Spor v. Crested Bute Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1987) this Court stated that the sole inquiry on a 
summary judgment motion is whether there is a material issue of 
fact to be decided. And in Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., 
Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970), this court pronounced 
that Summary Judgment is never used to determine what the facts 
are, but is only used to ascertain whether or not there are any 
issues of fact in dispute. The fact that the trial court made 
findings of fact in its December 31, 1991 Minute Entry 
establishes that issues of fact were present in the case which 
precluded the trial court from granting Summary Judgment. 
Because both the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
failed to apply the proper standard of procedure and review on 
Medico's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court must exercise 
its discretion and review this case to insure that justice is 
served and that the lower courts properly apply this Court's 
rulings when handling cases such as this. 
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On April 11, 1990, Bradford Medico moved for Partial 
Summary Judgment, seeking to clear title in a motor home, 
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Vehicle Identification Ho. 3132 112U02476. The time tor 
answering having elapsed, no other part:es having responded tw 
the Motion, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECKED that 
Summary Judgment be and hereby is granted in favor of 3raa£orc 
Medico, and that Mr. Medico be granted all right, title and 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH H. EASTMAN and 
SALLIE EASTMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL WESTON, et al., 
Defendants. 
WILLIAM AND RUTH HILL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MANUEL ONTIVEROS, dba CUSTOM 
AUTO SALESV and WESTERN 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. 880907950 CN 
The plaintiffs Eastman recorded their lien on February 17, 
1988. They could have protected their interests by recording 
the lien anytime after March 31, 1987. Because they failed to 
do so, defendant Medico purchased the vehicle unaware that 
there was an unrecorded lien. Medico recorded his interest on 
January 20, 1988. As such, he received his interest free of 
the lien claimed by the Eastmans. 
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After having reviewed the Eastmans' Memorandum, I am of the 
view that the Summary Judgment initially granted was proper. 
The Judgment is hereby reinstated and I will endorse the 
initial Judgment (which was entered on May 14, 1990) to so 
indicate. 
Dated this 3\ day of December, 1990. 
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Paul Weston, Claudia Weston, 
Jay L. Brasher, d/b/a Salt Lake 
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Medico, Jimmie R. Hill and 
William E. Hill, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 910185-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Jackson (Rule 31) 
31. 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. 
Dated th /»*jj ttas day of November, 1991. 
Norman H. J#6kson, Judge 
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41-1-72. Necessary before transfer complete. 
Until the department shall have issued such new 
certificate of registration and certificate of 
ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be 
registered shall be deemed not to have been made and 
title thereto shall be deemed to be incomplete and not 
valid or effective for any purpose except as provided 
in Section 41-1-77. 
41-1-77. Owner not liable for negligent operation after 
transfer. 
The owner of a motor vehicle who has made a bona fide 
sale or transfer of his title or interest and who has 
delivered possession of such vehicle and certificate of 
registration and the certificate of title thereto 
properly endorsed to the purchaser or transferee shall 
not be liable for any damage thereafter resulting from 
negligent operation of such vehicle by another. 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at anytime, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for 
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(e) Form of affidavits: further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does 
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
